Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1978

Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Misinterpretation, Misdirection,
and the 1978 Amendments
Mack Player
Santa Clara University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
Mack Player, Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Misinterpretation, Misdirection, and the 1978 Amendments , 12
Ga. L. Rev. 747 (1978),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/760

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

DEFENSES UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT:
MISINTERPRETATION, MISDIRECTION,
AND THE 1978 AMENDMENTS
Mack A. Player*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits
employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies from discriminating because of age,' but it does not protect all age groups
against employment discrimination. As enacted, the 1967 Act pro* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. A.B., Drury College, 1962; J.D., University of
Missouri, 1965; LL.M., George Washington University, 1972. The author acknowledges the
invaluable participation of N. Karen Deming, J.D., University of Georgia, 1978. Many of the
ideas found herein were developed in a seminar paper written by Ms. Deming. Thereafter,
Ms. Deming worked with the author to combine their ideas on the subject and refine them
into this product.
'29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970). The Act provides in part:
§ 623. Prohibition of age discrimination.
(a) Employer practices.
It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
(b) Employment agency practices.
It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of such individual's
age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of such individual's age.
(c) Labor organization practices.
It shall be unlawful for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to
refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant
for employment, because of such individual's age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual
in violation of this section.
For a general discussion of the 1967 Act, see Levien, The Age Discriminationin Employment
Act: Statutory Requirements and Recent Developments, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 227 (1974); Note,
The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. Ray. 380 (1976).
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tected persons between the ages of forty and sixty-five; the amendments in April 19782 extended that protection five years to age sevThe Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-256, 92
Stat. 189 (1978).
The 1967 Act provided:
§ 631. Age limits.
The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least forty
years of age but less than sixty-five years of age.
29 U.S.C. § 631 (1970). Congress amended this provision in § 3(a) of the 1978 amendments
by inserting the following:
Sec. 12. (a) The prohibitions in this Act shall be limited to individuals who are at
least 40 years of age but less than 70 years of age.
(b) In the case of any personnel action affecting employees or applicants for employment which is subject to the provisions of section 15 of this Act, the prohibitions
established in section 15 of this Act shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40
years of age.
(c)(1) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of
any employee who has attained 65 years of age but not 70 years of age, and who, for
the 2-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive
or a high policymaking position, if such employee is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred
compensation plan, or any combination of such plans, of the employer of such employee, which equals, in aggregate, at least $27,000.
(2) In applying the retirement benefit test of paragraph (1) of this subsection, if
any such retirement benefit is in a form other than a straight life annuity (with no
ancillary benefits), or if employees contribute to any such plan or make rollover contributions, such benefit shall be adjusted in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Secretary, after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, so that the benefit
is the equivalent of a straight life annuity (with no ancillary benefits) under a plan to
which employees do not contribute and under which no rollover contributions are
made.
(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit compulsory retirement of any
employee who has attained 65 years of age but not 70 years of age, and who is serving
under a contract of unlimited tenure (or similar arrangement providing for unlimited
tenure) at an institution of higher education (as defined by section 1201(a) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965).
(b)(1) Sections 12(a), 12(c), and 12(d) of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, as amended by subsection (a) of this section, shall take effect on January
1, 1979.
(2) Section 12(b) of such Act, as amended by subsection (a) of this section, shall
take effect on September 30, 1978.
(3) Section 12(d) of such Act, as amended by subsection (a) of this section, is
repealed on July 1, 1982.
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92
Stat. 189 (1978).
All discrimination within the protected age group is prohibited. Thus to discriminate on
the basis of age against an employee who is 45, favoring one who is 60, is a violation of the
Act. Discrimination against those outside the age group, however, is not a violation. Thus it
is permissible to favor a 25-year-old applicant over one who is 39. It is also permissible to
favor an applicant who is 45 over one who is over 70 because the complaining party is outside
the protected age group. 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1977).
2
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enty. Thus it is not illegal to discriminate against people before their
fortieth or after their seventieth birthday.
The Act, in its original and amended versions, contains five exceptions or "defenses" to age discrimination in employment: (1)
discipline for "good cause"; 3 (2) differentiations based on
"reasonable factors other than age";' (3) use of age where age is a
"bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business"; 5 (4) observance of a
bona fide seniority system;6 and (5) observance of the terms of a
3 Section 4(f)(3) of the 1967 Act provides: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization. .. (3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an
individual for good cause." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3) (1970). For interpretation of that section,
see Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1973), where the court upheld a
discharge based on excessive tardiness.
' Section 4(0 (1) of the 1967 Act provides in part: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization-(l) to take any action otherwise prohibited...
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1)
(1970).
In the exercise of his interpretative function the Secretary of Labor has set forth a relatively
detailed description of reasonable factors other than age. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103, .104 (1977).
The Secretary has indicated:
Evaluation factors such as quantity or quality of production, or educational level,
would be acceptable bases for differentiation when, in the individual case, such factors
are shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements and where the criteria or
personnel policy establishing such factors are applied uniformly to all employees,
regardless of age.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(2)(1)(iii) (1977).
Physical fitness requirements are permissible provided that such minimums are reasonably
necessary for the specific work to be performed and are uniformly applied regardless of age.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(f)(1)(i) (1977). Hiring based on test performance is not necessarily invalid
but the court will scrutinize them closely for both adverse impact on older applicants and, if
such impact exists, a reasonable relationship to the job to be performed. 29 C.F.R. §
860.104(b) (1977).
The regulations, however, specifically provide that refusal to hire older workers because of
the high cost involved is discrimination purely on the basis of age. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h)
(1977). But cf. Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976), where
the court used a combination of work record and relative high cost of older workers to sustain
a layoff of predominantly older workers when an economic slowdown required a general layoff.
See also Stringfellow v. Monsanto Co., 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970), where the court
upheld an employer's use of past performance and relative ability to determine layoff order
despite its adverse impact on older workers. Accord, Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F. Supp.
364 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
3 Section 4(f)(1) provides in part: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
agency, or labor organization-l) to take any action otherwise prohibited. . . where age is
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). The Secretary of Labor has interpreted this
section in 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1977).
6 Section 4(f)(2) provides in part: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment
agency or labor organization-(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system." 29
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bona fide benefit plan, such as retirement or insurance.'
Since defenses essentially admit the presence of discrimination on
the basis of age, the first two exceptions are not true "defenses." If
an employer disciplines or reassigns a worker for "good cause," then
age is not the motivating factor in the employment decisions. And
if the employer distinguishes among workers because of "reasonable
factors other than age," there is obviously no age discrimination.
Presentation of "good cause" or "factors other than age" is part of
an employer's rebuttal of the plaintiff's prima facie showing of age
discrimination 8 and not a defense to the admitted discrimination.
U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970). The Secretary of Labor has interpreted this section in 29 C.F.R. §
860.105 (1977).
7 Section 4(f)(2), in addition to protecting seniority systems, provides in part: "It shall not
be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization-(2) to observe the
terms of. . . any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance
plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)
(1970). Section 4(f)(2) contains a caveat "except that no such employee benefit plan shall
excuse the failure to hire any individual."
I Under Title VII, litigation of race, sex, religious, and national origin discrimination can
be divided into two categories. The first category includes "motive" cases usually involving
a single, one-on-one employment decision. The issue presented is whether improper causes
motivated the employer. The second category includes cases challenging class-based rules
having a broad adverse impact on a protected class. The issue in these cases is not so much
the employer's motive but whether employer "business necessity" justifies the adverse impact of the rule.
The first category of cases, involving single acts where motive is the issue, is governed by
the rule in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court has set up a
system of shifting burdens. The plaintiff first must prove membership in a protected class,
basic ability to perform the job, application, rejection, and the employer's filling the job with
someone other than a minority or woman. Then the burden shifts to the employer to establish
that the employment was motivated by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. In cases deal.
ing with class-based rules that adversely affect a protected class, the plaintiff must prove the
adverse impact, and then the employer has the burden of proving the business necessity for
the rule. Thus in each situation, the economic, nonprescribed factors that the employer must
present are not true defenses but are part of his burden once the plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing of improper discrimination. The ultimate risk of nonpersuasion on the issue of
discrimination remains with the plaintiff. See Causey v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 416 (6th
Cir. 1975).
The courts have indicated that they will take a similar approach under the Age Act. In
Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977), the employer fired
the plaintiff, a 57-year-old employee, and replaced him with a 19-year-old. The defendant
asserted that the plaintiff was terminated because of inadequate performance. The court held
that to establish a prima facie case of illegal age discrimination the plaintiff must prove that
he was within the protected age group (at that time 40-65), that he was discharged, and that
he was replaced with a person outside the protected age group. To rebut the prirda facie case,
the burden was on the employer to demonstrate that the older employee was unable to
perform. See also Bonham v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977). In Hodgson v.
Earnest Mach. Prods., Inc., 479 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1973), however, the court required specific
proof that the employer knew that the employee was within the protected age group and
would not accept the employee's appearance as proof.
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Thus only the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ),
"bona fide seniority system," and "bona fide benefit plan" are true
defenses. These three defenses assume that an employer, union, or
agency is basing employment decisions in part upon the age of the
employee or applicant and would violate the Act but for the statutory provision permitting the age discrimination.
Prior to the 1978 amendments, some lower federal courts bizarrely
construed the BFOQ defense. In addition, the Supreme Court itself
gave a strained construction to the benefit plan defense in United
Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann Congress designed the 1978 amendments to alter the result in McMann by prohibiting mandatory
retirement even when required by an otherwise bona fide plan.'"
Congress did not, however, alter the prior, bizarre interpretations of
the BFOQ defense, nor did it resolve whether benefit plans and
seniority systems must have independent economic or business justification when applied to current employees if they discriminate on
the basis of age.

H".

THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION

(BFOQ)

A. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin if the ground for discrimination is a
"bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business."" The Age Discrimination Act adopts virtually identical language except that it replaces "religion, sex, or national origin"' 2 with "age." The parallel
language indicates that Congress intended for the courts to interpret
434 U.S. 192 (1977).

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95.256,
92 Stat. 189 (1978). Section 2(a) of the 1978 amendments provides for the insertion of the
following phrase into § 4(f)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970): "and no such seniority system
or employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual
[protected by this Act] because of the age of such individual." The amendments provide
limited exceptions from this mandatory requirement. Those between 65 and 70 who have held
a position for two years may be retired pursuant to benefit plans which will equal $27,000
per year. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95'

256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).

The Conference Report states: "The conferees specifically disagree with the Supreme
Court's holding and reasoning." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
11Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.2(e) (1970).
1229 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970), quoted at note 5 supra.
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both statutes similarly. 3 The Secretary of Labor, whom the Age Act
charges with interpretation and enforcement, construes the BFOQ
defense similarly to prevailing Title VII interpretations." The courts
have also indicated that they will interpret the BFOQ defense similarly under the Age Act and Title VII. 15 Thus one would expect the
analysis of the BFOQ defense under the Age Act to be consistent
with Title VII analysis. This has not been the case, however. Although the courts have given lip service to Title VII standards, they
have not carefully followed them.
B. Title VII Interpretationsof the BFOQ Defense
The Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provide that the courts should narrowly construe the BFOQ
defense."6 The defendant cannot rely on class-based assumptions
about comparative abilities, and stereotyped characterizations of
qualifications, interests, or abilities do not suffice."
[In order to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification
exception the employer has the burden of proving that he had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all [persons in a protected class]
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
the job involved. 8
One court limited the BFOQ defense even more stringently, holding that the defense is available only when all members of the class
are intrinsically unable to qualify. For example, a male is intrinsically unable to serve as a wet nurse. Absent an intrinsic inability
to qualify, "employees otherwise entitled to the position [may be]
excluded only upon a showing of individual incapacity."' 9
,1See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 n.11 (4th Cir. 1977). For general intent to follow
parallel analysis, see Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.
1977).
" See 29 C.F.R. § 860.102 (1977). The Reorganization Plan No. 1 issued by President Carter
February 23, 1978 and approved by Congress transfers enforcement of the age act from the
Department of Labor to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as of July 1, 1979.
11Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
11EEOC Interpretative Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1977).
' 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii),(iii) (1977).
" Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
" Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Furthermore, inability of the class to perform the job means more
than just inability to perform collateral, secondary, or peripheral
duties. To disqualify an entire class under the BFOQ defense, the
employer must establish that the duties they cannot perform go to
the "essence" of the business operation." By preventing the employer from utilizing the forbidden classification unless it is
"reasonably necessary to the normal operation," the statute, in effect, imposes a business necessity test. The employer cannot prove
necessity if it is merely inconvenient or slightly more expensive for
him to hire without regard to proscribed classifications. The
"business necessity" test obligates the employer to make accommodations in his work force and assignments. Rather than completely
disqualify an entire protected class of applicants because of their
inability to perform a collateral element of the job, the employer
must assign the collateral duties to those capable of performing
them. Necessity presupposes accommodation, and accommodation
is the alternative to overinclusive, class-based disqualifications.
Title VII analysis has recognized that jobs with little or no human
risks and minor economic consequences from unqualified performance require a high degree of correlation between a disqualifying
rule and predicted job performance. 2 On the other hand, as human
risks and economic consequences of misperformance increase, an
employer can justify selection criteria with less of a proven relationship to job performance. At some point the courts require job qualifications for high risk jobs to be only rational.2 Thus the greater the
risk factor-the likelihood of harm multiplied by its severity-the
less scrutiny the court will give to a job qualification and thus the
greater the likelihood that the court will determine that the qualification is necessary to the essence of the job. The greater the risk
factor, the easier it is to pass the BFOQ or business necessity test.
In construing Title VII, the courts have also recognized the reality
of situations where precise selection criteria are impossible to formulate. Some jobs, particularly highly skilled or professional occupations, are by their nature subjective in performance. Evaluation
of performance thus becomes subjective. The courts permit imprecise selection criteria when qualifications are hard to identify and
2 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971).
21 Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); Castro v. Beecher, 459
F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975); 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(c)(2)(iii) (1977).
22 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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evaluate and job performance is difficult to measure objectively.,3
The courts are even more lenient when the job involves high human
or economic risks.
C. The BFOQ Defense Under the Age DiscriminationAct
Thus far four courts of appeals have construed the BFOQ defense
under the Age Act. The first two cases, Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc.,? and Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,5 involved

virtually identical facts and issues. The cases gave the defense a
broad, strained, and clearly erroneous interpretation.
In both cases the employer was an interstate commercial bus
company that refused to hire new drivers over age thirty-five. The
bus companies had two work classifications: the "regular runs" and
the "extra board." The extra board classification was more strenuous and was generally agreed to be less desirable. Extra board
drivers were subject to call twenty-four hours a day, and the company could, with little notice, require them to make irregular and
frequently very long runs. Placement on regular runs was determined by a collectively negotiated seniority system. All new employees entered and remained at the extra board from ten to forty
years until their seniority allowed them to claim a desired regular
run.
The bus companies justified their refusal to employ persons in the
protected age group of forty to sixty-five by presenting general and
conclusory evidence that driving skills deteriorate with age. The
companies further justified their actions on the basis of the difficulty in identifying with tests or medical examinations the deteriorating skills or potential health hazards. The defendants argued
that since the applicants would begin work at an older age, in the
most strenuous classification, they could not hope to progress to the
less strenuous regular run before their driving skills began to deteriorate and their health became less predictable. On this combination
of grounds the companies argued that age was a bona fide occupational qualification.
In each case plaintiffs countered defendants' justifications by
making two arguments. First, plaintiffs pointed out that defendants
" Coopersmith v. Roudebush, 517 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc.
v. Members of the Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), enforced, 497
F.2d 1113 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d
1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
21 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
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were improperly attempting to establish a BFOQ by generalized
statistics and class-based assumptions when the defense required
proof that "all or substantially all" persons within the protected age
group could not perform safely and efficiently. Second, the plaintiffs
attacked the statistics directly by pointing to the accident records
which showed that the highest incidence of accidents occurred during younger years. In fact, the safest age group was fifty to fifty-five.
The defendants responded by pointing out that when the job
involved substantial human and economic risks the employer could
establish the BFOQ by apparently reasonable qualifications supported by generalized statistics, particularly when, as here, individualized evaluations would be difficult or inconclusive. Furthermore, the defendants said that the plaintiffs' conclusions as to accident records were tainted because drivers in the fifty to fifty-five age
group had gained years of driving experience and were often in the
less strenuous regular runs. Defendants attributed the high accident
rate of the younger drivers largely to the strenuous extra board.
In Greyhound,2 the first case, the Seventh Circuit accepted defendant's arguments and ruled that the defendant had established
the BFOQ defense as a matter of law. The court stated:
Due to such compelling concerns for safety, it is not necessary
that Greyhound show that all or substantially all bus driver
applicants over forty could not perform safely. Rather, to the
extent that the elimination of Greyhound's hiring policy may
impede the attainment of its goal of safety, it must be said that
such action undermines the essence of Greyhound's operations.
Stated differently, Greyhound must demonstrate that it has a
rational basis in fact to believe that elimination of its maximum hiring will increase the likelihood of risk of harm to its
passengers.Y
This part of the court's statement of the legal principles involved
is not to be severely criticized. The court, however, did not stop
there; it concluded: "Greyhound need only demonstrate however a
minimal increase in risk of harm for it is enough to show that elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one more
person than might otherwise occur under the present hiring practice." 2s Here the Court appeared to overstate the legal standard and
- 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).

v Id. at 863.
= Id.
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gild the lily by permitting pure speculation to justify the refusal to
hire apparently qualified applicants. Although the primary error of
Greyhound is the court's application of legal principles to the facts
presented, even the court's statement of the BFOQ defense is not
entirely accurate.
In the later Tamiami case, the Fifth Circuit appeared to disagree
with some of the Seventh Circuit's analysis 9 but nevertheless affirmed the trial court's acceptance of the defense. The court held
that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous because the
individualized health and safety determinations were inconclusive.
Thus the court permitted generalized but reasonable conclusions
that safety risks increased with age.
In reaching their similar conclusions, both courts purported to
utilize Title VII standards to analyze the issue. Some aspects of
their analysis are acceptable. For example, few would challenge the
premise of Greyhound that when dealing with high risk, subjective
jobs, the employer may relax the precision of selection criteria."
" The court believed that the test was a two-pronged approach based on two Title VII
cases, Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), and Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). The court
correctly reasoned that Diaz required an analysis of the job to determine what duties an
employer could require that each employee be able to perform. The court criticized the
Seventh Circuit's reading of Diaz as imposing a relaxed standard of analysis when safety is
at issue. After determining what is the "essence" of the job under Diaz, the Fifth Circuit
indicated that the next step is to determine under what circumstances an employer may
eliminate an entire protected class of applicants. For guidelines the court looked to Weeks.
Weeks set forth alternative approaches: (1) If there is a factual basis for believing that all
or substantially all persons over age 40 would be unable to perform the "essence" of the job
(to drive a bus safely), then an employer may eliminate all persons over 40; or (2) if it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with persons over 40 on an individual basis, an employer may accept reasonable statistical conclusions. 531 F.2d at 235. It appears that the
court was unhappy with the very broad language in Greyhound, see text accompanying
note 28 supra, and was perhaps more strictly limiting the application of the BFOQ defense
by requiring this two-pronged analysis rather than the Greyhound single-pronged analysis.
- See Spurlock v. United Air Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), where in a race
discrimination case the court allowed an employer to demand of applicants for positions as
airline flight engineers a college degree and a high number of flight hours. Although this had
an adverse impact on black applicants, the court sustained its use as reasonable given the
"high degree of economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant." The
Fifth Circuit in Tamiami indicated that this case had no application to issues involving
BFOQs. Technically, the court is correct: Spurlock involved "business necessity" for a neu.
tral rule having an adverse racial impact. The basic principles, however, are the same. In
analyzing job qualifications, even the EEOC indicates that
[t]he smaller the economic and human risks involved in hiring an unqualified applicant relative to the risks entailed in rejecting a qualified applicant, the greater the
relationship needs to be in order to be practically useful. Conversely, a relatively low
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Similarly, one would accept the conclusion of Tamiami that when
individualized evaluation is difficult, employers may resort to the
best evidence available to establish ability.3 1 Thus if the evidence
had established that inexperienced bus drivers of the applicant's
age presented a currentstatistical risk and that individualized evaluations of that risk were unreliable, there would be little reason to
challenge the courts' acceptance of the BFOQ defense. 32 That issue,
however, was not presented. Defendants conceded that statistically
the forty-year-old driver presented no present threat to the safety
of the public. The basis of the courts' holdings was that at some
future time, given the usual operation of the seniority system, these
applicants, if hired, would present a statistically greater risk than
would a younger applicant. Thus it was not age alone but the applirelationship may prove useful when the former risks are relatively high.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(2)(c)(iii) (1977). See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), where
the Supreme Court upheld a BFOQ for sex discrimination against female prison guards in
contact positions in an all male penitentiary. Clearly, the Court was influenced by the degree
of potential danger involved when it did not demand a close evaluation of the real relationship
between the sex of the applicant and the job. Consider, too, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), where the level of validation of tests for police officers was less than the level of
validation required in other occupations.
1' See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969); see
also Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d
1333 (2d Cir. 1973), enforced, 497 F.2d 1113 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) (police);
Note, Title VII and Discriminationin "Upper Level" Jobs, 73 COLUM. L. Rav. 1614 (1973).
32Even accepting the legal principles as sound, one could easily disagree with the level of
proof permitted to sustain the application of the admittedly relaxed standard. For example,
company rules did not require senior drivers to leave the extra board. In fact, the employer
allowed some older drivers with sufficient seniority for regular runs to remain on the strenuous
duty, 531 F.2d at 238 n.32, indicating that safety really was not a significant concern. Furthermore, since it sometimes took as long as 40 years seniority to effect a transfer to a regular
run, a driver 25 years old when hired might be 65 before he secured a regular run. There was
no mandatory retirement of older extra board drivers who did not have sufficient seniority to
transfer. Finally, the statistics indicated that after age 55 the incidence of accident increased.
Yet the employer imposed no mandatory retirement at age 55. Again, safety does not seem
to be a significant factor. On the other side of the coin, in some instances a driver with as
little as 10 years seniority might have been able to secure a regular run. Thus a driver40 years
old when hired would be only 50 at the time of the transfer and would be in the "safe" range.
As the employer interpreted the safety statistics, experience was the key, and 16 years was
the optimum amount. Thus a 40-year-old applicant would have this experience by age 56.
The employer argued that drivers in the 50-55 age group have the lowest accident records
because of their experience. Yet the employer apparently gave no credit for similar driving
experience of its applicants over 35 years old. In short, it looked as though the employers hired
younger persons based on stereotyped conceptions. They manipulated the statistics to provide a post hoc rationalization for.their action. Certainly, well-marshalled counter statistics
and a well-directed argument prompted another court to reject the superficial and generalized
statistics which the defendants in these two bus driver cases presented. See Houghton v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978).
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cation of the seniority system to the age of the applicant that

prompted recognition of the BFOQ. Absent the seniority system it
is doubtful that either court would have recognized the defense. The
seniority system was the key to the analysis. 3
The courts' recognition of the general importance of bona fide
seniority systems is also superficially correct. Its application to the
facts presented, however, is equally misplaced. Under Title VII
analysis, when reasonable alternatives to class-based exclusions are
available, the courts generally require the employer to avoid the
harshness of the exclusion by following less discriminatory alternatives.3 4 Thus, arguably, the bus companies should have placed the
older employees in the regular run classification when their age no
longer safely permitted their use on the extra board. Reassignment
of the aging employee would have been an alternative less discriminatory than denying employment to the entire class of applicants
over age forty. But the employers in both cases had contractual
seniority systems that precluded resort to this alternative. The
courts gave controlling weight to those seniority systems, never suggesting that the employer should disregard them in order to avoid
the adverse impact on older applicants.
At the time these two cases were decided there was substantial
authority that ordinarily Title VII not only mandated accommodation but also forbade any use of seniority systems that frustrated
accommodation and resulted in the exclusion of an entire class unless the employer could prove that the seniority system itself had
independent "business necessity." Applying the statutory terms,
11The Tamiami court was not as directly concerned with the seniority system but concentrated on the appropriate standard by which to measure the BFOQ defense. Concluding that
it was impossible to measure safety and health precisely, the court simply affirmed the trial
court's finding of a BFOQ on the ground that the lower court had made a factual finding
which was not clearly erroneous.
3,See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1007 (1972): "[T]here must be available no acceptable alternative policies or
practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced or accomplish it
equally well with a lesser differential racial impact." (footnote omitted) This concept was
applied in a constitutional context in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974),
and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). The idea is that even superficially reasonable
rules should not be overbroad; they should not discriminate against a protected class any
more than is necessary to accomplish the employer's valid purpose. Overbreadth is itself
improper discrimination.
For a sample of the uniform authority striking down unit seniority systems that perpetuated past racial discrimination, see United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Local 189 United
Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). The
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the courts held that a seniority system that resulted in discrimination against a protected class and that was not supported by
"business necessity" was not the "bona fide seniority system" the
statute required.
In 1977, however, the Supreme Court in Teamsters v. United
States31 dramatically altered this analysis of seniority systems.
Relying upon the legislative history of the Title VII seniority defense
and the importance of seniority in American collective relationships, the Supreme Court concluded that, even absent independent
business necessity, if the seniority system was not designed or intended to exclude the protected class, the employer could continue
to apply that system even when it adversely affected a protected
class.
Thus, the two cases interpreting the Age Act, perhaps anticipating Teamsters, were correct in determining that the court need not
set aside a seniority system to accommodate the needs of older
applicants. Furthermore, these cases were correct to the extent that
they held that an employer need not ignore an established seniority
system and pass over a younger but senior employee to place an
older applicant or employee in a job that he could perform. Nor
should the employer disregard the seniority system simply because
the older, junior employee, because of age, can no longer safely or
efficiently perform. The cases, however, did not present that issue.
No applicant sought a regular run. No employee sought to transfer
from the extra board or asked that the employer disregard the seniority system in order to accommodate his aging condition as an
alternative to discharge. Again, it was the applicant's age and the
undefinable future deterioration of skill coupled with the
anticipatedeffect of the seniority system that prompted these employers' refusal to hire on the basis of age. It was not the application
of the seniority system.
Taken in isolation, therefore, two aspects of the courts' analyses
Secretary of Labor's Interpretative Guidelines also provided that when examining seniority
systems under the Age Act, "a seniority system which has the effect of perpetuating discrimination which may have existed on the basis of age prior to the effective date of the Act will
not be recognized as 'bona fide."' 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(b) (1977). Leading decisions indicated,
however, that in determining layoffs an employer could justifiably utilize plant seniority even
if the impact was to discriminate against recently hired women and minorities. Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. Local Unions 327, 749, 1289, 1298, 1303, 1309, and 1314, IBEW, 542
F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1976); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. denied,
431 U.S. 965 (1977); Watkins v. Steel Workers Local No. 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
"International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See also United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
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were superficially correct. First, in high risk situations statistical

data might support a refusal to hire on the basis of age if the employer could establish that a person of the applicant's age presents
a statistically greater risk than a younger employee or that individualized evaluation of skill or health is an unreliable predictor.
Second, the employer may honor established seniority systems. If
the only way to retain an older employee is to make an assignment
that would violate the system, the employer may legally refuse to
accommodate the employee rather than disregard established seniority rights.17 Thus, no serious error exists in the general statements
of legal principles in Greyhound or Tamiami. The error of these
courts was to place these two principles together and apply them to
a situation applicable to neither. For two reasons, it was error to
permit the anticipated operation of the seniority system to justify
the current refusal to hire an otherwise currently qualified employee.3 First, it misconstrues Title VII premises. Second, it ignores
the special wording of the Age Discrimination Act in which the
BFOQ defense appears.
3 The 1978 amendments to the Age Act provide that "no such seniority system or employee
benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual. . .because
of the age of such individual." Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (amending § 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1970)).
This amendment arguably could dictate a contrary result. It could prohibit all use of seniority
to force retirement of an individual. Thus if retirement is the alternative to disregarding the
seniority system, this amendment may require an employer to disregard the seniority system.
It is doubtful, however, that the courts will interpret the amendment in this way. A seniority
system could not by its own operation and its own terms impose an involuntary retirement
based on age. Retirement pursuant to the seniority system, however, is based on the
"system," not "age." See text accompanying notes 89-95 infra. It is doubtful that Congress
intended the amendment to prohibit the recognition of seniority systems in such a situation.
Indeed, the legislative history of the amendment indicates that Congress intended to retain
the BFOQ concept and apply it in its former force to employees no longer able to perform.
H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977); S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1977); 123 CONG. REc. S17298 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Senators Javits and
Williams). The purpose of the amendments was to alter the Supreme Court's decision in
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), which permitted mandatory retirement pursuant to retirement plans that included within the plans obligations to retire before
age 70. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978). It is doubtful, too, that
without debate and discussion Congress was attempting to overturn the results of the Supreme Court's decision in Teamsters. Thus if the application of the system prohibits a junior
employee from transferring to a job he can perform, the amended Act does not prohibit the
employer from continuing to recognize the seniority system and discharge the employee who
is no longer capable of performing his assigned duties.
11The seniority system, however, would not necessarilyprohibit the transfer of a driver to
a regular run while he was within the age group presenting the lowest risk of accident. The
facts indicated that in some cases transfer was possible with 10 years seniority. Thus a driver
hired at age 40 could possibly secure a regular run by age 50. The safest age group was 50-55.
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A key element of Title VII analysis is that selection criteria "must
measure the person for the job, and not the person in the abstract."
Clearly, the courts, in upholding the denial of bus drivers' jobs to
these applicants, did not measure them for the job for which they
applied. They measured them "in the abstract," rejecting them
because at some future time they might not be qualified to perform.
The employees might have quit, died, been promoted into management, transferred to a nondriving job, or even secured the seniority
necessary for regular runs before age presented a statistical risk to
the company. If and when a risk arose, the company could act. But
until the risk exists, the employer should not, because of an abstract
possibility of future events, have the right to deny the applicant a
job he admittedly can perform.
The EEOC employee selection guidelines provide:
If job progression structures and seniority provisions are so
established that new employees will probably, within a reasonable period of time and in a great majority of cases, progress
to a higher level, it may be considered that candidates are
being evaluated for jobs at that higher level. However, where
job progression is not so nearly automatic, or the time span is
such that higher level jobs or employees' potential may be expected to change in significant ways, it shall be considered that
candidates are being evaluated for a job at or near the entry
level . . . . [Plerformance at a higher job level is a relevant
criterion. . . only when there is a high probability that persons
employed will in fact attain that higher level job within a reasonable period of time."°
Although not directly controlling on the issue of future performance,
the teachings of this guideline are relevant. Unless an employer
expects that within a reasonable period of time the employee will
be unqualified to perform the duties the employer will assign to him,
he must make his selection on the basis of the duties that he initially
expects the employee to perform. Anticipated future performance
must rest upon future evaluations. Moreover, as noted above, if the
employer can avoid the adverse impact of class-based exclusions by
using a less discriminatory alternative, he has a statutory duty to
make these reasonable accommodations."
" Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
0 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(1) (1977).
" See note 34 supra.
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The employer has two options: (1) deny these qualified applicants
employment because at some future time the seniority system
might not permit them to transfer to a less demanding job, or (2)
hire them, and if the employer cannot find other work when they
can no longer safely perform as extra board drivers, discharge them
at that point. The bus companies elected the first option. There is
little employer justification for premature, sweeping refusals to hire
when future termination, if necessary, would serve the employer's
valid goals just as well. For the applicant over forty, work for a few
years with a chance for a transfer is a less discriminatory alternative
than no work at all. The second option, which the employer rejected
and the courts ignored, clearly has a lesser discriminatory impact.
The unique and specific wording of the Age Act also supports the
conclusion that the employer cannot use future disqualification and
the operation of a seniority system to justify a refusal to hire. Under
section 4(f)(2) of the Act, an employer may "observe the terms of a
bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan
• . . except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual."4 A fair construction of this section
is that it specifically prohibits the use of seniority systems as an
excuse for the refusal to hire. The benefit plan and seniority system
defenses both appear in the same subsection. Despite the wording
in the "failure to hire" proviso at the end of section 4(f)(2), the
proviso arguably qualifies both "benefit plans" and "seniority systems." Thus it could read, "[n]o such benefit plan (including seniority systems) shall excuse the failure to hire any individual."
Moreover, even if the term "benefit plan" in the proviso does not
literally include "seniority systems," the intent of the drafters
seems clear. The employer can use these common types of systems
(benefit and seniority) to make age distinctions among employees
but can use neither "system" to deny employment. It would indeed
be anomalous specifically to prohibit the employer from using benefit plans to deny employment but permit a seniority system, protected by the same statutory subsection, to justify the refusal to
hire.
Current support for this interpretation is found in the 1978
amendment which expressly provides that employers may not use
seniority systems to justify discharges based on age. 3 The same
,229 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1977) (emphasis added).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a),
92 Stat. 189 (1978): "[N]o such seniority system . . . shall require or permit the involuntary
retirement of any individual [protected by this Act] because of the age of such individual."
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concept should apply to refusals to hire. The employer can use
seniority only to distinguish among employees, not as a basis for
denying employment.
The legislative history of the 1967 Act also supports the Act's
direction toward securing hiring opportunities. Although recognizing that some systems might justify age distinctions among employees, the legislators indicated that the employer could not use those
systems to deny employment initially."
The Secretary of Labor has concluded that the BFOQ defense is
to "have limited scope and application." It is an exception "to be
construed narrowly," with the burden of establishing the defense
upon the employer, union, or employment agency asserting it.' 5 The
Secretary expressly recognizes the defense only when federal statutory law or regulations impose mandatory age limits, e.g., Federal
Aviation Agency pilot age limitations, 6 and where age is an intrinsic
characteristic necessary for the job, e.g., models and actors. The
courts have held that these interpretative guidelines are to be given
substantial deference. 8 The bus driver cases, however, instead of
following a narrow interpretation, broadly construed the defense.
The courts allowed the employers to carry their burden rather easily, not by proof of any present inability, but based upon speculative
future problems. The courts permitted the employers to run ramp-

ant with statistics with no attempt to give each individual the great" The stated purpose of the Age Act was to "promote employment of older persons." 29
U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970). In discussing the seniority benefit plan provision, the House Committee reported: "This exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the bill-hiring
older workers-by permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in
employee benefits plans." H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 4 (1967), reprinted in
[1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2217.
In the debate, Senator Yarborough stated that the Act "will not deny an individual employment or prospective employment, but will limit his rights to obtain full consideration in the
pension, retirement, or insurance plan." 113 CoNG. REc. 31255 (1967). In addressing the
impact of the seniority and benefit plan amendments, Senator Javits stated that "bona fide
retirement and seniority systems will facilitate hiring rather than deter it and make it possible
for workers to be employed without the necessity of disrupting those systems." Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Labor of Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 28 (1967). This history is quoted and discussed in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann,
434 U.S. 192 (1977).
The thrust was to allow the systems to operate freely without deterring employment. The
Greyhound and Tamiami courts' interpretations had nothing to do with the operation of the
systems but in fact allow their existence to deter hiring of older workers.
-7 29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1977).
- Id. at § 860.102(d).
Id. at § 860.102(e).
"Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1
(1965); Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225,228 (D. Minn. 1971).
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est possible chance of employment consistent with valid employer
safety interests. In short, these two courts grossly misinterpreted
and misapplied the BFOQ defense.
The recent case of Arritt v. Grisell49 justifiably questioned the
vitality of the analysis in the bus cases. The employer in Arritt was
a police department which refused to hire police officers over age
thirty-five. Relying on Greyhound, the trial court summarily dismissed a complaint challenging the rule. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the issue according to the
following test:
[The burden is on the employer to show (1) that the bfoq
which it invokes is reasonably necessary to the essence of its
business (here the operation of an efficient police department
for the protection of the public), and (2) that the employer has
reasonable cause, i.e., a factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons within the class (in our case, persons
over 35 years of age) would be unable to perform safely and
efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible
or impractical to deal with persons over the age limit on an
individualized basis."
The court specifically rejected the "minimal increase of risk" test
which the court in Greyhound had used.5'
This recent pronouncement pointedly omitted consideration of
risk factors. In a footnote, however, the court indicated that risk
might be a valid factor to consider on remand in determining the
job's "essence." 5 Although citing Tamiami3 with approval, the
court did not even suggest that the future operation of the seniority
system was a factor for denying employment. That is a significant
omission.
The final noteworthy court of appeals treatment of the BFOQ
defense is Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.," in which the
issue was whether the employer could reassign a fifty-two-year-old
test pilot to nonflight duties because of his age. As in the bus driver
cases, the defendant presented generalized, statistical data to demonstrate that reflexes and health decline with age. Here, however,
567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1271.

51499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
52 567 F.2d at 1271 n.14.

531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978).
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the plaintiff countered with specific evidence that he was in excellent health and had little chance of heart attack or stroke while
flying and that the greatest cause of accidents is pilot error based
on lack of experience, not illness or impaired reflexes. Plaintiff
pointed to military and government practices and regulations permitting military and civilian pilots to continue flying until at least
age sixty.
As in the other cases, the court adopted Title VII standards. The
court stated that the burden is on the company to demonstrate that
it has a "factual basis for believing that substantially all of the older
pilots are unable to perform the duties of test pilot safely and efficiently or that some older pilots possess traits precluding safe and
efficient job performance unascertainable other than through
the court
knowledge of the pilot's age."' Applying that standard
56
BFOQ.
a
establish
to
failed
had
defendant
that
held
Thus, a superficial anomaly is presented. Under current law, age
is a BFOQ for bus drivers but not for test pilots. This, however, is
an oversimplification. In the test pilot case, the issue was whether
the employer could justify the transfer of the particular pilot on the
basis of age. The plaintiff marshalled strong and specific evidence
indicating the lack of significant danger if he continued for a few
more years. The situation presented to the court differed from the
bus cases in which the employer refused to hire on the basis of age,
relying upon the anticipated impact of seniority systems upon the
aging bus driver. The Houghton test pilot case, however, indicates
that the court was strictly construing employer claims that age and
accidents are necessarily correlated. It did not blindly accept, as did
the bus driver cases, generalized assumptions about ability decreasing with age, partly because the plaintiff used rebuttal evidence
more persuasively and partly because the court was aware that it
must strictly construe and closely analyze the defense even when
the defendant raises arguments of safety.
D.

The 1978 Amendments

The 1978 amendments to the Age Act did not address the BFOQ
defense. A Senate amendment specifically allowed mandatory re- Id. at 564.
Accord, Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976). The court refused to impose
mandatory retirement on an assistant fire chief. Although the court recognized health and
safety arguments, it imposed on the defendant a heavy burden to show specifically how the
potential health of this employee would jeopardize the defendant's interests.
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tirement of an employee if the employer demonstrated that age was
a BFOQ. The House bill had no BFOQ provisions. In conference,
the Senate receded; the conference agreed that the Senate amendment worked no change in the law and was unnecessary. The final
bill thus did not alter the 1967 language.
The House Committee Report, discussing the prohibitions of
mandatory retirement under benefit plans, did indicate that the bill
was not designed to "prohibit mandatory retirement or other employment practices where age is a bona fide occupational qualification.""8 The Report continues:
It is recognized that certain mental and physical capacities
may decline with age, and in some jobs with unusually high
demands, age may be considered as a factor in hiring and retaining workers. For example, jobs such as some of those in air
traffic control and law enforcement and firefighting have very
strict physical requirements on which public safety depends.
The committee, however, expects that age will be a relevant
criteria for only a limited number of jobs. 9
As discussed above, the specific prohibition of age-based discharges
because of a seniority system adds credibility to an already strong
argument that the mere existence of seniority systems cannot justify
refusals to hire.
E. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense in
Perspective
The remedial purpose of the Age Discrimination Act was to
counter the assumption that older workers are not as efficient as
younger workers. In the early cases involving bus drivers, the courts
seemed much too willing to accept generalized correlations between
aging and ability. Using the justifiable concern of public safety as
a rationale, they did not critically analyze the evidence. This relaxed attitude simply perpetuated the very evil the statute was
attempting to remedy. In later cases, the courts appear to be resisting the temptation to accept generalized assumptions about the
risks inherent in employing older workers. They are demanding
proof of actual inability and are critically analyzing that proof.
These decisions more faithfully serve the purposes of the Act.
, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
s,Id.
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The courts in the early bus driver cases stretched the BFOQ defense to justify the refusal to hire presently qualified employees on
the assumption that their future susceptibility to ill health might
increase risks of unsafe performance. The employer bootstrapped
the BFOQ defense by claiming that the existence of the seniority
system prohibited the hiring of the older worker because he probably would not be transferred to a less strenuous position prior to the
age at which the risks would increase. The argument is spurious; it
completely misconstrues the concept of BFOQ developed under
Title VII and the Age Act. Allowing speculation about future ability
or inability to justify refusal to hire presently qualified applicants
could destroy the effective application of the statute. It is still a bit
too early to tell, but the later cases, particularly the Fourth Circuit
case of Arritt v. Grisell,6 appear to ignore or avoid the misconstruction of the earlier bus driver cases. The courts should not only ignore
them; they should bury them before they corrupt or trap unwitting
litigants and courts.

-III.
A.

BONA FIDE BENEFIT PLANS

Introduction

Many, if not most, large employers have employee benefit programs dependent upon the employee's salary, age, and length of
employment. An employer might use a benefit plan to justify age
discrimination in three situations. First, the employer might refuse
to hire an older applicant because the employer believes older employees will disrupt the actuarial calculations on which the plan is
based. This is particularly true of health care programs. Second, the
plan would have an adverse impact on older employees if persons
hired at an older age were not to quality for a pension because of
length-of-service vesting requirements or if the older employee's
health or retirement benefits were less or cost the employee more.
Thus the effect of the plan would be to discriminate against the
worker hired at a later age. Third, the benefit plan might call for
-retirement of employees on the basis of age.
- 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). It is also worthy of observation that no court has specifically approved of the reasoning in Greyhound. In the subsequent bus driver case, Usery v.
Tam iami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), the court specifically disapproved
of the broad test announced in Greyhound and rather reluctantly affirmed a trial court ruling
that the defendant had established the BFOQ defense. Other cases, although not directly
related to the issue resolved in Greyhound and Torniarni, have given the defense a rather
strict interpretation. See Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
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Recognizing the use of benefit plans as a potential problem, the
1967 Act, in section 4(f)(2), sets forth the "seniority-benefit plan"
defense:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension
or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual."
The Act clearly resolves two of the possible situations in which the
employer might utilize a benefit plan to affect older persons adversely. First, the proviso clearly stipulates that the employer cannot use the benefit plan as an excuse for failing to hire an applicant.
Regardless of the good faith, the bona fides, or objective reasons why
the plan could not actuarially accommodate the older applicant,
that plan cannot justify age discrimination in the initial employment decision.
As to the second situation, adverse impact on older employees,
the Act and its accompanying history clearly permit the employer
to apply a benefit plan to distinguish among employees"2 with the
" 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1977).
62 The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor, H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess. 4, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 2213, 2217, stated that:
"This exception serves to emphasize the primary purposes of the bill-hiring of older work.
ers-by permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in employee benefit plans." Senator Yarborough commented on this point in the Senate debates, 113 CoNG.
REc. 31255 (1967):
I wish to say to the Senator that that is basically my understanding of the provision
in line 22, page 20 of the bill, clause 2, subsection (f)of section 4, when it refers to
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, it means that a man who would not have been
employed except for this law does not have to receive the benefits of the plan. Say an
applicant for employment is 55, comes in and seeks employment, and the company
has bargained for a plan with its labor union that provides that certain moneys will
be put up for a pension plan for anyone who worked for the employer for 20 years so
that a 55-year-old employee would not be employed past 10 years. This means he
cannot be denied employment because he is 55, but he will not be able to participate
in that pension plan because unlike a man hired at 44, he has no chance to earn 20
years retirement. In other words, this will not disrupt the bargained-for pension plan.
This will not deny an individual employment or prospective employment but will limit
his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension, retirement, or insurance plan.
The Secretary of Labor's Interpretative Guidelines also emphasize this point:
For example, an employer may provide lesser amounts of insurance coverage under a
group insurance plan to older workers than he does to younger workers. . . .Further,
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caveats that the plan must be "bona fide" and not "a subterfuge to
evade the purposes of the [Act]." Consequently, assuming that the
plan is objectively bona fide and subjectively not used as a
"subterfuge," an employer could simply apply his plan to his work
force. The employer may follow his plan even if it requires a certain
vesting period that effectively prohibits workers employed at a later
age from claiming benefits. A plan may provide for differing health
or retirement benefits'even though the employer contributes equal
amounts for each employee; such a plan would be lawful. Some
plans having equal employer payments may require the older employees to pay more for coverage, and the defense would protect
these plans as well.s
As to the third situation, the 1967 Act was silent. Clearly, absent
a benefit plan, forced retirement of those within the protected age
group is a prima facie violation of the Act. Thus the issue is to what
extent the employer may use a retirement plan as a defense to the
prima facie violation.
The history of the 1967 Act is ambiguous; segments and sequences
an employer may provide varying benefits under a bona fide plan to employees within
the age group protected by the Act, when such benefits are determined by a formula
involving age and length of service requirements.
29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1977).
9 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1977). The Secretary of Labor provides more specifically:
A retirement, pension, or insurance plan will be considered in compliance with the
statute where the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred, in behalf of an
older worker is equal to that made or incurred in behalf of a younger worker, even
though the older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of pension, or retirement
benefits, or insurance coverage.
Id.
The courts have not followed this result under the pay discrimination provisions of Title
VII. In City of Los Angeles v.Manhart,U.S. , 98 S. Ct. 1370 (1978), the Supreme
Court held that an employer who made equal retirement contributions for each employee but
required each female employee to contribute more to the retirement program engaged in
illegal sex discrimination. The Court rejected the argument that a woman's longer life expectancy and the employer's equal contributions for all employees justified the disparate treatment. Cf. EEOC v. Colby College, 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977), in which the court
distinguished Manhart because the employer made similar monthly annuity payments for
male and femkle employees but because of actuarial longevity, upon retirement the females
received a lower monthly retirement payment and the males received lower death benefits.
Manhart would not compel a similar result under the Age Act. The Age Act has a specific
defense permitting the application of bona fide benefit plans; Title VII does not. Furthermore,
the legislative history of the Age Act's § 4(f)(2) benefit plan defense indicates that differing
benefits or employee costs based on age were contemplated and santioned. See text accompanying note 59 supra & note 78 and accompanying text infra. Thus at least if the employer
payments or costs are the same regardless of age, differing end benefits or differing costs to
employees would not constitute illegal age discrimination.
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support conclusions on both sides of the issue. 4 The Department of
Labor, however, in exercising its interpretive and enforcement function, concluded that "the Act authorizes involuntary retirement
irrespective of age, provided that such retirement is pursuant to the
terms of a retirement or pension plan meeting the requirements of
section 4(f)(2)."11 Thus if a benefit plan is "bona fide" and not used
as a "subterfuge," the Labor Department would have sanctioned its
application to force retirement.
By 1975 the Department had modified its position somewhat, but
rather than revoke its interpretative guideline, it directed its enforcement policy on an end run around that guideline. The Department pointed out that although involuntary retirement was not per
se improper, it was permitted only if the benefit plan was bona fide
and not a subterfuge. By interpreting the statute's two qualifying
terms, the Department concluded that a qualified plan could legally
permit mandatory retirement only if early retirement was "essential
to the plan's economic survival or to some other legitimate purpose-i. e., [that it was] not in the plan for the sole purpose of
moving out older workers.""6 Thus, although conceding that, at least
theoretically, plans could demand retirement, the Department
added an interpretative gloss on the concepts of "bona fide" and
"subterfuge" that indirectly prohibited mandatory retirements
under many, if not most, plans. Most employers simply could not
demonstrate economic reasons flowing from the plan itself that
would justify early retirement. In the lower federal courts, this interpretative sleight of hand had a mixed reception.
The first case arose in the Fifth Circuit." The court rejected the
Secretary's argument and held that a plan enacted prior to 1967, the
effective date of the statute, could not, as a matter of law, be considered a "subterfuge." The second case arose in the Fourth Circuit. 8
There the court adopted the Secretary's position. The court rejected
the notion that the date of the retirement plan's initiation was relevant in determining whether or not it was a subterfuge. In addition,
" See majority and dissenting opinions in United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192
(1977).
29 C.F.R. § 860.110 (1977).

Department of Labor Report, January 1975, cited in Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901,
908 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978). That enforcement approach was ap.
parent in a case that the Secretary of Labor initiated. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,
500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
£

McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), revd, 434 U.S. 192

(1977).
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the court accepted the argument that the concept of subterfuge
required the early retirement provisions to have an economic or
business purpose apart from desire to remove older workers. In the
final case, the Third Circuit"9 agreed with the Fourth Circuit's evaluation that the concept of subterfuge did not depend upon the date
of the retirement plan's initiation. The issue as this court saw it was
whether the forced retirement under the plan violated a purpose of
the Act. The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit on whether subterfuge contained an element of independent
economic justification. According to the Third Circuit, Congress
intended to distinguish between "retired" employees and
"discharged" employees by permitting mandatory retirement pursuant to a plan paying meaningful benefits to the retired employee
even though the employer did not establish an independent economic or business justification for early retirement. 70
This division among circuits prompted the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in the Fourth Circuit case to review the holding that
"subterfuge" contained a requirement of independent economic justification which the employer must prove in order to permit early
retirement pursuant to an otherwise bona fide plan.
B. Resolution(?) of the Issue: Mandatory Retirement Under the
1967Act-United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann
In UnitedAir Lines, Inc. v. McMann,71 a sixty-year-old employee
was forced to retire pursuant to a retirement plan which the employer had established in 1941. Plaintiff was hired in 1944 and
joined the retirement plan in 1964. It was established that the plan
paid substantial benefits to retiring employees and that it had been
regularly applied to all persons when they reached sixty. The plaintiff conceded that the plan was "bona fide" in that it existed and
provided benefits72 but argued that it was a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the Act because it lacked any independent economic
justification for the forced retirement. On the other hand, the defendant conceded that if it had adopted the plan after 1967, it would
Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
n Accord, Dunlop v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 415 F. Supp. 330 (D. Hawaii 1976); Steiner v.

National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 377 F. Supp. 945 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See also
De Loraine v. Meba Pension Trust, 499 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1974), which dealt inferentially with
the issue here presented; Hodgson v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225
(D. Minn. 1971).
434 U.S. 192 (1977).
7'Id. at 194.
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not satisfy the elements of the defense." The defendant argued,
however, very subtly, that because it had adopted the plan prior to
the effective date of the Act, as a matter of law it could not be a
subterfuge. The parties thus presented to the Supreme Court a very
narrow issue for resolution.
The plaintiff did not rely upon a per se rule that all mandatory
retirement pursuant to any plan was outside the defense and thus
illegal; the Secretary of Labor's regulations preclude this 'argument.
The plaintiff admitted that if a plan was "bona fide" and not a
"subterfuge," the employer could use it to force involuntary retirement. Furthermore, the plaintiff elected not to utilize the concept
of bona fide as the vehicle to impose a requirement of independent
economic justification. The plaintiff proposed a very narrow and
restrictive interpretation of "bona fide," conceding that a plan
would meet that requirement if it existed, was regularly applied,
and provided meaningful benefits to retired employees. The defendant, on the other hand, conceded that if he had adopted the plan
after the effective date of the Act, it would be a "subterfuge." The
defendant thus effectively conceded that independent economic justification was required of all post-Act retirement plans.
In all of this misdirection which the litigation stance of the parties
created, it is understandable how the Supreme Court's approach to
the problem left much to be desired. The Supreme Court directed
the bulk of its opinion to the issue of whether Congress intended to
prohibit, as a matter of law, involuntary retirement pursuant to
admittedly bona fide plans. Since the parties had not made and the
court of appeals had not relied on this argument, this aspect of the
Court's opinion appears directed more to the per se argument of the
dissent than to the issue presented. Nonetheless, the Court concluded what the parties virtually conceded: Congress intended to
permit involuntary retirement pursuant to bona fide, nonsubterfuge
benefit plans.
Less than a half a page of the opinion, however, addressed the
issue actually framed by the parties, that is, whether a plan adopted
prior to the Act is a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the Act
unless the employer can establish the independent economic justification for the early retirement. The Supreme Court disagreed with
the Fourth and Third Circuits that the date of the plan is immater" McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192
(1977).
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ial. It adopted the position of the Fifth Circuit, concluding that
Congress did not intend "invalidation of retirement plans instituted
in good faith before [the Act's] passage," nor did Congress intend
"to require employers to bear the burden of showing a business or
economic purpose to justify bona fide pre-existing plans . ... [A]

plan established in 1941, if bona fide, as conceded here, cannot be
a subterfuge to evade an Act passed 26 years later."'
Certainly, the Court's analysis can be criticized. But when the
parties kept directing the Court to a particular shell, one can hardly
blame the Court for lifting the shell and finding no pea. For example, no one, including the Secretary of Labor, argued that Congress
had created a per se rule outlawing all mandatory retirement regardless of the nature of the plan. The Court's somewhat gratuitous
agreement with them can hardly be blamed on the Court. Second,
the appropriate place to analyze the objective element of business
or economic necessity is under the rubric of "bona fide." The term
"bona fide" carries with it all the objective elements that would
make a proffered justification legally acceptable. To be bona fide
one could assume that the plan must be at least concrete, if not
written. It must be regular in form, predictable, and similarly applied to persons similarly situated. Presumably the concept requires
some communication to employees of the existence of the plan. "
Bona fide requires that the employee receive meaningful benefits
from the plan and that the plan not violate other statutes or public
policy by having, for example, improper race or sex distinctions.n
All these are objective elements. Independent economic or business
78
justification is also an objective element.
The statutory element of "subterfuge," however, is entirely different; it is subjective. It carries connotations of intent, motive, and
71

434 U.S. at 203.
Cf. Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1974).

7' See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(b) (1977). The Fourth Circuit assumed that element to be an
element of bona fides in McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), reu'd,

434 U.S. 192 (1977).
7 29 C.F.R. § 860.105(d) (1977).
7 From the Secretary's interpretative guidelines, see notes 62-63 supra,one could infer that
if the employer did not contribute equal amounts for each employee but distinguished among
employees on the basis of age and paid older workers less or utilized some system having no
actuarial, economic, or business justification, the benefit plan would not be bona fide. When
the term "bona fide" is used in conjunction with "occupational qualification" in the BFOQ
defense, the courts quite clearly treat the concept of bona ides as an objective element
encompassing business justifications. See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
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purpose. A plan is a "subterfuge" and will not support discrimination because of age even though it is objectively reasonable if the
employer uses it for improper reasons or to secure an improper
goal.7" Thus when plaintiff conceded that the benefit plan was objectively "bona fide" and then attempted to impose on the subjective
term "subterfuge" the objective element of business necessity, he
imposed a burden the term could not easily bear. It is not surprising
that a court could conclude that "subterfuge" does not require proof
of business necessity.
On the other hand, there is little justification for the Court's
conclusion that as a matter of law a plan adopted prior to the Act
could not be a subterfuge. Under the Court's reasoning, two employers with identical retirement plans, adopted for identical purposes,
would be treated differently. Even if the purpose of the pre-Act plan
was to rid the employer of older workers whom he believed to be
inefficient and expensive, the obviously improper purpose, if framed
in a plan adopted prior to the Act, was immaterial. The Court
overlooked the import of the statutory language, which prohibits
subterfuge to avoid, not the command of the Act itself, as the Court
supposes, but the "purposes of the Act." Clearly one of the purposes
of the Act is to prohibit invidious distinctions among employees
because of age. Remedying this form of discrimination is a purpose
that the court should honor, not avoid under some arbitrary time
sequencing.
The Court, however, is not entirely to blame for its strained construction. There were two ways the Court could uphold forced retirement under apparently bona fide retirement plans. It could take the
approach of the Fifth Circuit and conclude that the employer need
not establish economic necessity for retirement under pre-Act
plans.10 Alternatively, it could have concluded, as did the Third
Circuit, that proof of economic necessity was never required; all
plans, pre- or post-Act, were to be judged on the basis of a limited
noneconomic concept of bona fide.' The defendant's concession
that post-Act plans without economic justification would violate the
Act prevented the Court from following the second option. To be
11Hence the subterfuge element of § 4(f)(2) serves as a check ori the objective test of the
"bona fide" element. Even though a plan may be technically bona fide applying objective
standards, if the motive for adopting or inaintaining the plan contravenes the purposes of the
Act, the plan will not pass muster under § 4(0(2).
Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974).
t Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
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consistent with its view of congressional intent in the face of defendant's concession, the Court was virtually forced to conclude that

the pre-Act adoption insulated from attack an otherwise bona fide
82
plan.

To present the issue as it should have been presented, the plaintiff
should not have conceded that the plan was bona fide. Rather, it
should have argued that to be bona fide, the plan must satisfy many
objective elements, including some independent economic reason
apart from the desire of the employer to rid itself of older workers.

It is far more manageable to analyze the objective element of economic reasons under the rubric of the objective term "bona fide"

than under the subjective element of "subterfuge." On the other
side of the counsel table, the defendant perhaps should not have

conceded that post-Act benefit plans must justify forced early retirement in terms of business necessity. Defendant could have

argued that regardless of when enacted, "bona fide" refers only to
existence, regularity, and benefits. Had the parties proceeded in

this manner, they would have presented the Court with the precise
issue that it needed to resolve. As it was, the Court resolved both
too little and too much: too little because the role of bona fide and

subterfuge in analyzing post-Act plans is still undecided; too much
because the Court could have resolved the key underlying issues

without its sweeping confirmation of virtually all pre-Act retirement
plans.
C.

The 1978 Amendments
With promptitude rare for Congress, it revised McMann by stat-

ute. Congress amended section 4(f) (2) in 1978 by providing that "no
such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require or per-

mit the involuntary retirement of any individual [protected by the
Act] because of the age of such individual."" The legislative history
Although McMann reached the Supreme Court before Zinger, the Court could have
continued the McMann case and granted certiorari in Zinger which presented the issue mare
clearly. By so doing, the Court could have addressed the issue of economic necessity directly.
13The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978). The statute has three saving clauses. The first allows retirement
pursuant to a collective agreement in effect on September 1, 1977, until the termination of
that agreement, but no later than January 1, 1980. The second permits mandatory retirement
of tenured college professors between the ages of 65 and 70 until July 1, 1982. The third
exception allows the mandatory retirement of bona fide executives or high policymakers
between the ages of 65 and 70 if the employee has held that position for at least two years
prior to forced retirement and the employee is entitled to an immediate, nonforfeitable
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of the amendment clearly indicates Congress's intent: "The conferees specifically disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in [McMann]. Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of
enactment are not exempt under section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact
that they antedate the act or these amendments.""
With the addition of this limitation there are now two restrictions
on the bona fide seniority and benefit plan exception. The 1967 Act
provides that the employer may not use a plan to refuse employment, and the 1978 amendments provide that the employer may not
use a plan to require or permit involuntary retirement. The employer must base an employee's mandatory retirement prior to age
seventy on "cause," "factors other than age," or a "bona fide occupational qualification."
What the amendments do not address is the extent to which the
employer. may use a plan to discriminate among employees. The
plans still must be "bona fide" and not used as a "subterfuge" to
avoid the purposes of the Act. Although the history clearly indicates
that the date of adoption of the plan is immaterial in resolving the
issues of bona fides and subterfuge, it adds little additional light on
the proper interpretation of those statutory terms. That is why the
misdirection of McMann is so unfortunate. Because of the plaintiff's
restrictive argument of "bona fide," the Court found that the parties had conceded that the plan met the statutory definition of
"bona fide" and thus did not give any interpretative guides to that
term. Because the Court rested its opinion on the sweeping view
that no pre-Act plan could be a subterfuge, it did not scrutinize that
element either. And now, even though the history of the amendments establishes that a pre-Act plan can be a "subterfuge," there
is no statutory guidance as to exactly what is and is not within the
term.
D.

Suggested Analysis
The 1978 amendments unequivocally answer the major interpretative problem of the 1967 Act, that is, under what circumstances
an employer can use a retirement program to retire involuntarily
employees within the protected age group. The amendments say
never! The result is that regardless of good faith and bona fides, the
pension, profit-sharing, or deferred compensation plan equal to $27,000 per year. The executive exemption has no termination date.
1 H.R. CONF. RsP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
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employer can apply seniority systems and benefit plans only to
current employees. Even as to them, however, these systems and
plans must pass muster as both "bona fide" and not a "subterfuge
to evade the purposes of the [Act]." Both the Act and the amendments leave unresolved the determination of when the systems and
plans meet the qualifications of "bona fide" and non-"subterfuge."
More particularly, must economic or business necessity justify benefit and retirement plans applicable to current employees? For example, can an employer, without proof that he bases his denial on
sound economic necessity, deny an employee hired at a later age the
right to participate in a health care program because inclusion of
the older worker would work an undue hardship on the employer or
threaten the solvency of the plan? Can an employer pay maximun
retirement benefits at age 65, thereby inducing early retirement by
denying employees incremental increases in retirement benefits by
their continuing to work until age 70? Absent an economic justification for freezing benefits is it a permissible, bona fide application
of the system? The issue remains open even after Supreme Court
opinion and an amendatory statute which purportedly addressed
the general problem.
It is submitted that the appropriate analysis should include the
concept of business necessity as an element of bona fides. A rule
that discriminates directly or indirectly against older workers is only
bona fide if it has some objective justification. The absence of objective economic justification indicates arbitrariness, and arbitrary
action can hardly be bona fide. Furthermore, the term "bona fide,"
when used in conjunction with "occupational qualification," imposes an objective business necessity element.9
aArritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). The boundaries of this concept of
"bona ides" including an economic necessity element are beyond the scope of this Article.
A brief example, however, of economic considerations should illustrate the point. An employer could make equal contributions for each employee toward payment of a group life,
health, or retirement plan. The plan would not be invalid just because benefits might differ
on the basis of age or because some older employees might be required to make personal
payments in order to continue their participation. See note 63 supra. But if the employer were
to cut off all payments to any such program and drop the older employees from the program
entirely, he would need some business or economic necessity to support his action. Because

the employer would be denying the employee a form of compensation solely on the basis of
age, he would have the difficult burden of showing that the amount saved by dropping the
older employee from the plan was economically justifiable in terms other than business costs.

By inference the Secretary's interpretative regulations support this thesis.
An employer should not be allowed to use the existence of a benefit plan to reduce the
effective compensation of his older employees. Employers need not increase their costs
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It is submitted, too, that "subterfuge" is solely an element of
subjectivity. Thus if the employer imposes on his employees a benefit plan for the purpose of discouraging older workers from seeking
or continuing employment the plan is a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of the Act regardless of the plan's objective justifications.

The courts should not allow post hoc justifications to justify purposeful age discrimination."8

This theory, although modified somewhat, was the approach
taken by the Fourth Circuit in McMann. That court recognized the

basic concept that in order to utilize a plan that discriminates
against older employees an employer "must have some economic or

business purpose other than arbitrary age discrimination."' Although the Supreme Court reversed the decision, it did not reverse
this point. More important, Congress specifically approved the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit decision. Thus, if one can draw any

inference from this history, it is that Congress reads into the concept
of bona fides an element of business or economic justification for the
plan. Without such economic justification, the employer cannot use
with the age of the employees. Nor should they be allowed to discriminate in the
benefits supplied by reducing forms of indirect compensation to the older employees.
29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1977).
Some support can also be found in the 1978 legislative history. The Senate Committee
Report on the 1978 amendments indicates:
Concerns were also expressed regarding potential increased costs for employee welfare benefit plans such as disability, health, life and other forms of insurance for
employees. Presently some employers reduce coverage for older workers under these
plans or increase the required employee contributions as workers advance in age. This
bill would not alter existing law with respect to these practices.
S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977).
It is significant that the report allows a reduction in benefits or an increase in employer
contribution but does not permit a decrease in employer contribution. The same report later
emphasizes the importance of actuarial and real costs in evaluating the plan. Id. at 16.
Representative Waxman, commenting on the proposed legislation, stated that "[in the
absence of actuarial data which clearly demonstrates that the costs of this service are
uniquely burdensome to the employer, such a policy constitutes discrimination and a conscious effort to evade the purposes of the Act." 124 CONG. REc. H2277 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1978).
" Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975). Although Albemarle was a Title
VII case; the Court indicated that even statistically validated preemployment tests might be
improper if the plaintiff could establish that the employer used the test as a pretext to
discriminate against applicants on the basis of race. See also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), where the Court held that even if the employer had substantial
business justification for discrimination against employees, the discrimination would violate
labor relations legislation if it were actually motivated by a desire to discriminate because of
union membership.
" McMann v. United Air Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217, 221 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192
(1977).
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the plan to justify the challenged discrimination under section
4(f)(2).u Thus, as a freeze on benefits at a particular age such as 65
has elements of subterfuge and may lack objective economic bona
fides it should not be permitted.
At the very least courts and litigants should avoid confusing the
two elements that are necessary to validate a benefit plan. Objective
justification such as the actual existence and regularity of the plan,
communication to employees, and economic reasons for the plan's
provisions must be analyzed in terms of the plan's bona fides.
Subjective elements such as purpose and intent for adopting or
applying the plan go to the issue of "subterfuge." Most of the analytical confusion on this point results because the parties do not
clearly identify the appropriate role of the two statutory elements.
IV.

BONA FIDE SENIORIrY SYSTEMS

Section 4(f)(2) of the Age Discrimination Act allows employers,
unions, and employment agencies "to observe the terms of a bona
fide seniority system." The 1967 Act would seem to prohibit the
employer from refusing to hire an employee because of the existence
of that seniority system. Two courts have allowed an employer to
refuse to hire bus drivers on the basis of the anticipated operation
of the company's seniority system, and the first part of this Article
criticizes this result. 9 The 1978 amendments are even clearer in
their prohibitions against using the seniority system to force an
involuntary retirement or discharge: "[N]o such seniority system
• . .shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual [protected by the Act] because of the age of such individual."90 A fair reading of the Act would seem to lead to the conclusion
that the employer cannot use seniority systems as a basis for either
refusal to hire or discharge but only to differentiate among employees.
Two major issues about the use of seniority remain. The first issue
is whether the Act prohibits the employer from using seniority to
determine lay-off and recall. The statute does not permit seniority
systems to require involuntary retirement because of age, but it does
not prohibit retirement (temporary or otherwise) because of the
application of the seniority system. When a lay-off is necessary for
See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 24-56 supra.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95.256,
92 Stat. 189 (1978).
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general economic reasons, using seniority to determine layoffs will
often adversely affect a particular age group." Nonetheless, in spite
of the adverse impact on a particular age group the lay-off is not,
in the words of the statute, "because of the age of the individual."
The lay-off is because of the lack of seniority. 2 Such use of a "bona
fide seniority system" is protected by the Act.
The Supreme Court's decision in Teamsters v. United States93
virtually dictates this result. The Court held in Teamsters that
under Title VII the neutral application of an otherwise bona fide
seniority system was valid and that the employer need not disregard
an established seniority system in order to avoid adverse impact.
Other cases have specifically held that Title VII allows an employer
to follow a seniority system which mandates that the last hired be
the first fired even though he fires a disproportionate number of
recently hired minorities and women. 4 To hold to the contrary
under the Age Act, i.e., to prohibit the discharge made pursuant to
a seniority system, would clearly frustrate the policy the Supreme
Court announced.
The second issue that remains is whether in applying the seniority
system to current workers to award competitive advantages the
employer must justify the seniority system on the basis of independent business necessity. Under Title VII, prior to Teamsters, the
lower federal courts uniformly held that when the application of a
seniority system had a discriminatory impact, the employer could
honor seniority only if he justified it economically. 5 Absent that
justification the system was not "bona fide." The Supreme Court,
however, rejected that interpretation in Teamsters by holding that
the seniority system, if otherwise bona fide and applied in good

11The impact of a seniority system will generally be to prefer older employees over younger
ones, but the employer may make no intentional distinction on the basis of the age of the
applicant or employee if the distinction affects individuals within the protected age group of
45 to 65 (now 70). Thus to prefer a 50-year-old employee over one who is 40 would be equally
violative of the act as to prefer the younger over the older. It is not, however, a violation to
prefer an older worker over an employee less than 40 years old. 29 C.F.R. § 860.91 (1977).
See note 2 supra.
11See an opinion letter from the Department of Labor, 2 EMPL. PRAc. GuiDE (CCH)
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(1977). See also 29 C.F.R. § 800.140 (1977), so interpreting a similar seniority defense under
the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
, Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local Unions 327, 749, 1289, 1298, 1303, 1309, and
1314, IBEW, 542 F.2d 8 (3d Cir. 1976); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41
"

(5th Cir. 1975).
11See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
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faith, carries sufficient societal interests to justify its application
even absent additional and independent business reasons for its
application. The rationale would seem to be controlling under the
Age Act. Even if under the seniority system one class of employees
receives better treatment in part because of age, the employer need
not show separate economic reasons to honor the seniority system.
This conclusion may seem to conflict with the suggestion above
that in order to justify distinctions among employees, employee
benefit plans should be supported by independent justification. The
difference, however, is in the nature of the systems. Congress and
the courts have noted that seniority systems have significant societal value to both workers and employers wholly apart from strict
economic necessity. Benefit plans lack much of this inherent and
historical importance and thus need to carry some indicia of economic reasons to justify distinctions based on age. Absent these
independent indicia, benefit plans appear arbitrary and lack bona
fides.
V.

CONCLUSION

The first cases analyzing the BFOQ defense under the Age Act
gave lip service to Title VII analysis, but they grossly misapplied the
thrust of Title VII and the purposes of the Act by allowing anticipated future disabilities to disqualify presently qualified applicants.
They bootstrapped a BFOQ by anticipating operation of a seniority
system. The 1978 amendments did little to correct this misapprehension. Future courts must be alert to this erroneous approach.
The bona fide benefit plans went through a brief but stormy season of litigation over whether an employer could use a retirement
plan to retire mandatorily employees within the protected age
group. In a case presented in a confusing context, the Supreme
Court held that, at least for retirement plans predating the 1967
Act, the employer could mandatorily retire employees pursuant to
a bona fide plan. The 1978 amendments reverse the specific holding
of that decision and establish a per se rule: the employer may not
impose retirement before the employee is seventy years old regardless of any good faith or bona fides of the retirement program. The
employer must justify forced retirement of those in the protected
age group, if at all, under the "cause" or BFOQ defenses. Remaining
for resolution is the proper interpretation of the qualifications a
benefit plan must meet before the employer can apply the plan to
current employees. In short, what is meant by the statutory terms
"bona fide" and "subterfuge" is still unclear. Bona fide would seem
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to include the element of economic or business necessity, an objective element that must be present before an employer can use a
benefit system to discriminate among employees because of age.
"Subterfuge" is more appropriately analyzed as a subjective element that would prohibit the application of even a bona fide plan
if the employer uses the plan to discriminate on the basis of age,
Courts must be alert to the proper interpretation of these two terms.
The courts have yet to interpret seriously seniority systems under
the Age Act. The 1967 Act, as amended in 1978, prohibits the use
of a seniority system to deny employment or force retirement because of age. An employer, however, can probably act in good faith
even if he observes the plans in making employment decisions. Furthermore, unlike benefit plans, the Title VII case of Teamsters v.
United States would seem to control application of seniority systems. Thus the employer need not establish independent business
justification in order to prove the bona fides of the system and its
operation.
After eleven years, we know surprisingly little about the defenses
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
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